Instability in foreign exchange markets and currency dumping/manipulation cultivate further mistrust in international economic relations. At the same time, instability in foreign exchange markets and currency dumping/manipulation can be a cause of systemic risk. For example, foreign currency exposures were a key vulnerability behind the series of emerging market crises in 1997-98. The global financial crisis of 2008 also showed that currency mismatches are not just a concern for emerging markets. This chapter argues that currency mistrust exposes as flawed the notion that an international financial order may exist separately from the global monetary and trade and investment orders on a self-standing basis through the technocratic standards promulgated by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board, notwithstanding the importance of such standards. While said separation achieved a great deal in terms of integration of regulation and governance of international finance in the past three decades, at the same time, it has worked to promote financialisation and the global shadow banking sector. The paradox of the separation of the three international economic orders, albeit for defensible reasons, has given rise to massive rent-seeking by the global financial services industry. It has also undermined any efforts of creating coherent international structures for the governance and regulation of global finance, since these could be defended only if they were seen as integral in buttressing the global trade and investment order. Finally, the chapter proposes a transparent and objective benchmark for the approximation of currency values which could be the first step towards the reversal of the current trend towards currency and trade wars. Such reversal is the sole path towards rebuilding the trust required to augment the governance structures of global finance. 
trade, since financial flows and global markets, the most potent integrative force, are seen as an entirely separate matter. It has also undermined any thoughts of creating coherent international structures for the governance and regulation of global finance. 4 These would have to move from the current "soft law" status quo and that shift could be defended only if such structures were seen as integral in buttressing the global trade and investment order.
Setting the scene
Today, however, with mistrust towards the post-1994 global trade status quo 5 at record levels and with efforts towards the greater integration of the international financial order having come to a halt, some radical rethinking is overdue. Arguably, the agreement of the FSB lossabsorption standards (TLAC) for Globally Systemic Banks (G-SIBs) 6 has also included an extended transition of emerging market G-SIBs an indication of widespread consensus within the global regulatory community. But still agreement on TLAC was reached during 2014-5 and since meaningful cooperation on other looming issues like reining in on the riskiest forms of shadow banking or cooperation in derivatives clearing and settlement have moved to the back of the queue and under the radar. And it will be very hard for these discussions to be 4 In this context far-reaching but yet comprehensive international financial governance designs for a world financial council like those contained in the
Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and
Financial System (New York: United Nations, 21 September 2009), available at http://www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit/docs/FinalReport_CoE.pdf also known as the "Stiglitz Report", simply came to pass. The same should be said about the opposition to a the proposal for a World Financial Authority in K. Alexander, R. Dhumale, and J. Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems The International Regulation of Systemic Risk (OUP, 2006) . For another equally far-reaching but more complex/nuanced and pluralistic global financial governance design see E. Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, the Economics, the Politics (CUP, 2012), ch.9. 5 Arguably, this was heralded through the inception of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) after the conclusion of Uruguay round of trade negotiations with the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement in April 1994 and the signing of the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which came into force on 1 January 1994.
resuscitated in today's trade environment. It is unrealistic to believe that finance ministries and central banks accusing each other for currency manipulation, triggering currency wars, and ferociously undermining or unravelling key parts of the present trade order would be enlightened enough 7 to sit down in the refined environment of the FSB, the G-20, or the IMF/World Bank meetings and the Basel committee to thrash out new and closer forms of cooperation and integration in the field of international financial regulation. Any sound political economy approach to the workings of these forums would testify that such "lofty" ideals are not merely in the past but they have probably never been evidenced at least beyond the immediate aftermath of the GFC in 2008. As a matter of fact, it is now an accepted convention that the first wave of Basel capital regulations, so-called Basel I, were not just an attempt to shore up the resilience of international banks, but also a concerted attempt by western regulators to contain the competitive threat of Japanese banks. Accordingly, the objective of this chapter is two-fold. First, to highlight the importance of trust in currency parities, a much neglected, since the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangement in 1972, aspect of the global financial order from a political economy perspective.
Secondly, to argue that a system of more objective benchmarks of value could act as a partial stabiliser in the case of short-term capital flows augmenting trust between cross-border financial stability regulators and policy-makers. Even if the panic is about the stability of the country's financial sector and the quality of assets held in that sector, still much feared panic outflows can be slower, absent capital controls, when the indication of currency values is less unstable or uncertain, notwithstanding the fact that there is no perfect or incontrovertible measure of currency values.
The second goal of this chapter is to sketch the possible building blocks that may be used to construct a system or more objective benchmarks/measures of value when it comes to currency parities. Given of course the global experience with the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system of currency parities any mew mechanism must steer away from measures that would restrict currency circulation and prove deflationary. Similarly, a system of fixed parities 9 E.g., China, which took some large steps towards the liberalisation of foreign ownership in its financial sector, has de facto overturned this trend with new measures that require a very high asset threshold from foreign firms that wish to operate within its financial system. A U-turn that mainly affects US firms and probably has much to do with fears of destabilisation if there is a capital flight from its markets, as it happened in the summer of 2016 as much as the blistering rhetoric and US sanctions over PRC exports. See Any attempt to highlight the role of currency markets/parities as a means to further the integrative and cooperative goals of the global financial architecture inevitably encounters nearly insurmountable obstacles. First, even if there is such a thing as regulatory standard neutrality in global financial architecture any shift of the debate to the field of currency exchange governance takes the discussion away from the (ostensibly) technocratic zone that global financial governance structures/standards occupy to the realm of geopolitics. Secondly, in the current climate where economic nationalism and talk of protectionism are unmistakably on the surge, such a discussion could look futile. And this even before one moves to deal with the hard core economic aspects of global FX markets and their impact on competitive and comparative advantage in the global trade context, a discussion that is firmly outside the scope of this article. Third, any attempt to discuss a comprehensive currency exchange mechanism that incorporates, prima facie, objective benchmarks is from the outset hamstrung by the burden of history.
Finally and more critically, some currencies are so-called reserve currencies, e.g., the US dollar, the Euro, the Japanese yen, the Chinese RMB and parities may represent value that goes beyond economic fundamentals. Regardless of whether reserve currencies have been designated as such due to the economic might of the issuing state and the regular use of the currency in international payments, parities for such currencies do not merely reflect trade or other economic fundamentals but also the geopolitical importance of the issuing state. But if any objective benchmark of value would not apply to the most common reserve currencies what would be its utility after all? As a consequence one needs to think long and hard before endeavouring to draft an intervention in this area. To this effect I offer three reasons for doing so here.
First, while no system of measurement of currency value is perfect still the use of a system that compares a number of different parities with the basket of currencies in the IMF's Special Drawing Rights 10 and the value of fundamental indices like commodity, GDP, and stock prices can undoubtedly be a measure of value that is well adjusted to market and geopolitical forces. Secondly, the emergence of cryptocurrencies and other electronic tradeable units/tokens offers a unique opportunity to structure more objective reference points of currency value like those incorporated in the suggested here global unit of account. These may be complex, but yet tradeable reference indices which do not disregard the value of IMF's SDRs, 11 nor do they discard the known methods of measurement of currency value in economics such as measurements of purchasing power/parity and so on. Third, unlike the gold standard and other physical commodity anchors used in the past to measure the value of currencies any modern day benchmarks need not be deflationary, as tokenised benchmarks can instead reflect/incorporate some fundamental properties of fiat money.
This chapter is in five parts with the present introduction. The second part discusses the valuation intricacies of international currencies and the thorny question of currency wars and 10 IMFs' SDRs are an international reserve asset. They serve as the unit of account of the IMF and some other international organizations. SDRs are neither a currency nor a claim on the IMF. Rather, they are a potential claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members. SDRs can be exchanged for these currencies. Currently the value of IMF SDRs is based on a basket of five currencies-the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Chinese RMB and the British pound. SDR allocations can play a role in providing liquidity and supplementing member countries' official reserves, as was the case with the 2009 allocations totalling SDR 182.6 billion to IMF members amid the global financial crisis. See IMF Factsheet, "Special Drawing Rights", 18 April 2018. 11 The value of the SDR is determined daily based on market exchange rates. It is determined by tallying the value of the composite currencies in US dollars. IMF Data sheet, "SDR Valuation", 27 April 2018. The SDR basket is reviewed every five years, or earlier if warranted, to ensure that the SDR reflects the relative importance of currencies in the world's trading and financial systems. The reviews cover the key elements of the SDR method of valuation, including criteria and indicators used in selecting SDR basket currencies and the initial currency weights used in determining the amounts (number of units) of each currency in the SDR basket. These currency amounts remain fixed over the five-year SDR valuation period but the actual weights of currencies in the basket fluctuate as cross-exchange rates among the basket currencies move. The reviews are also used to assess the appropriateness of the financial instruments comprising the SDR interest rate (SDRi) basket. This is also important as the SDRi provides the basis for calculating the interest rate charged to members on their non-concessional borrowing from the IMF. See IMF Factsheet, "Special Drawing Rights", 18 April 2018.
their impact on trade. The third part discusses the financial stability risks of currency market instability. The fourth part discusses remedies under the existing IMF and WTO legal orders and the possibility of inserting clauses and remedies against currency manipulation in future bilateral and multilateral agreements, or even amending existing ones to this effect. It also offers a concise discussion of an alternative valuation method that is proposed in this chapter.
The fifth part daws the different strands of the present analysis to a comprehensive conclusion.
II. RESERVE CURRENCIES, CURRENCY WARS AND CURRENCY MANIPULATION

Mars or Mercury?
The identification of reserve currency values/parities is wide open to the so-called Mars and
Mercury debate. 12 The Mercury approach/hypothesis emphasises pecuniary motives and also highlights the importance of currency safety, liquidity, network effects, trade links, and financial connections which explain why some currencies are used disproportionately as a medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account by governments and private entities engaged in international trade and cross-border financial transactions.
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Another approach, used by political economists and applied mainly to the choice of reserve currency or currencies, emphasises strategic, diplomatic, and military power (together defined here as geopolitical power). If a country has such geopolitical power, foreign governments will see it as in their national interest to conduct their cross-border transactions using its currency. 14 The leading power for its part will possess political leverage with which to encourage the practice. In other words, international currency choice is from "Mars" rather than "Mercury". As Barry Eichengreen and his co-authors accurately observe this hypothesis helps to explain some otherwise perplexing aspects of the currency composition of international reserves. 15 Naturally the "Mars" view casts a question mark on measurements of currency value that focus exclusively on trade surpluses/deficits and gives credence to the quest for a more encompassing measure of value that wouldn't discount the geopolitical importance of reserve accumulation and parities. As the world's largest trading country, the United States is the largest loser from the manipulation of recent years. Because most of the intervention takes place in dollars, the dollar has been pushed to systemically overvalued levels. Bergsten and Gagnon (2012) estimate that the US current account deficit has averaged $200 billion to $500 billion per year higher as a result of the manipulation . . . [it] translates into a loss of between one and five million US jobs within the environment of continuing high unemployment and shortage of alternative policy instruments to remedy the problem.
Currency Manipulation and Currency wars
What US sources belatedly acknowledged, however, was that so-called currency manipulation also adversely affected large emerging economies such as Brazil, India, Mexico but the source of their discontent was not intervention in foreign exchange markets on behalf of the biggest world economies but rather expansive monetary policies such as very low interest rates and quantitative easing (QE). These while initiated in the period after the GFC they, in fact, Yet regardless of the motive, currency instability discourages investment and trade at all scenarios even if policies that aim to boost money supply in countries facing a recession and/or deflation could be used to also increase the level of imports, which, are however, more expensive after the implementation of expansive monetary policies and attendant falls in the value of the importing country's currency.
III. GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY RISKS
Financialisation and shadow banking
In general, shadow banking is a collection of unregulated institutions using a variety of debt instruments and credit enhancement and securities borrowing and lending techniques to extend credit and boost the liquidity of, in principle, illiquid assets and perform maturity transformation.
Shadow banking is also a great booster of financialisation given the spaghetti of transactions and counter-transactions and the commission income that each of them generates for the financial sector, even if the funding is not sourced from the financial sector or not even from the capital markets. It may instead come from the real sector, both corporates and individuals, looking for a way to gain a return on cash reserves or to enhance the return on their savings. Namely, the various shadow banking channels are also a good way to recycle cash reserves including FX reserves and direct saving away from productive investment. In fact, it seems that the bulk of this recycling and redistribution of liquidity does not escape Lord Turner's old adage that most modern financial activity is wasteful, namely the accumulated and recycled cash reserves seem to be, while secular 19 rather than cyclical, result of foregone real economy investment.
It is thus unsurprising that a large part of international forex transactions especially in eurodollar markets amounts these days to recycling of liquidity reserves through the use of global shadow banking channels. 20 One example is the exponential rise of global money market broker-dealers, another the direct recycling of the huge cash reserves of multinational corporations, 21 which increases interconnectedness in a number of invisible ways. 22 Given the increasing commingling of short-term debt with cash exposures this recycling also increases short-term (but also long-term) borrowing and lending in a foreign currency. A panic in global FX markets may start from nothing more than falling bond prices and a market sell-off, and not just the widely discussed problem of debt refinancing in a foreign currency. Poszar's study offers, in a different context, examples of the consequences of a bond markets' sell-off which, in the view of this author, could also trigger a panic in FX markets.
23 21 The numbers, as reported by Pozsar, are simply staggering: "First, on the global level, the secular rise of managed FX regimes in relation to the U.S. dollar is one explanation for the rise of cash pools held by FX reserve managers in the form of FX reserves' liquidity tranches, which are estimated at $1.5 trillion. Second, on both the global and local levels, the largest global corporations are holding more cash than ever before, estimated at more than $1.5 trillion. Unlike in previous decades, corporations today are net funding providers. There are many possible explanations for the increase in corporate cash pools. A likely contributing factor is the long-term secular increase in corporate profits as a share of national income, relative to wages. Corporations hold cash as a liquidity buffer for future investments; multinational firms may hold cash in foreign subsidiaries to defer or avoid taxes . . ." Poszar Ibid pp. 60-61.
22 E.g., Poszar argues that the secular rise of shadow banking due to structural imbalances in the real economy has also turned broker-dealers to "matched-book money dealers that stand between cash pools in search for safety, and various kinds of leveraged bond portfolios across the asset management complex in search for yield". This behaviour of course brings unleveraged fund managers well into the net of the leveraged shadow banking system developing "deep linkages between shadow banking and asset management, including not only hedge funds but also what are assumed to be unleveraged, "longonly" mutual funds. Whereas cash pools' problem is the structural shortage of safe, short-term, public assets (a shortage of public money), real money investors' problem is structural asset-liability mismatches driven by the secular decline of yields on safe, long-term, public assets relative to "sticky" return targets/expectations. The secular rise of leveraged betas (that is, the secular increase in the use of both cash and synthetic forms of leverage in bond portfolios) has been asset managers' way of helping real money investors bridge structural asset-liability mismatches through the provision of "equity-like returns with bond-like volatility". See Z. 26 While carry trades may earn a seemingly low-risk profit, since they receive higher interest rates on the money invested and pay lower interest rates on the money borrowed, a market losses before closing out the swaps. As a bond investor, the TRB fund would carry only minimal cash balances, which it needs to hold for redemption purposes. Thus, to pay its counterparty (Dealer A), the fund has to repo some of its bonds to raise liquidity to settle derivatives payables. 34 A conclusion extrapolated from Brunnermeier et al. who note: "In the currency setting, we can envision a country suddenly increasing its interest rate and thereby attracting foreign capital . . . In a frictionless and risk-neutral economy, this should lead to an immediate appreciation of the currencyassociated with an inflow of capital-and a future depreciation of the exchange rate such that UIP holds.
In the presence of liquidity constraints, however, capital only arrives slowly such that the exchange rate only appreciates gradually, occasionally disrupted by sudden depreciations as speculative capital is withdrawn. " Ibid. 315.
Cross border Financial Crises
Credit exposures in foreign currencies have historically proved a substantial source of financial stability and appreciable recession risk for two reasons. Short-term debt contributed significantly to East Asia's economic problems, particularly that not denominated in local currency. Short-term indebtedness increased significantly in 1995 and 1996 across the region . . . The primary problem with foreign investment in the short-term debt of emerging markets is the fluidity of the investment. Adverse economic news is likely to halt the rolling over of outstanding debt upon maturity and thus resulting in net capital outflows. This risk is analogous to capital flights. The secondary problem is that these outflows may foment a collapse in investor confidence. When the short-term debt is not denominated in local currency, volatility is heightened because a substantial devaluation will decimate a local currency portfolio. Accordingly, the first signs of a pending devaluation will prompt a severe sell-off.
The problem is compounded in countries with weak financial sectors where the domestic financial system cannot serve as an effective intermediary to allocate funds to productive uses but instead capital inflows often ended up in property and stock market investments, driving up the price of those assets forming in the process speculative bubbles. 36 Therefore, shifting currency risk to the non-bank sector could increase systemic risk in ways that could be harder to monitor and assess especially as these institutions (e.g., hedge funds, crossborder money brokers etc.) and large corporates are outside the regulatory perimeter. While a first approach to account for the impact of such leakages is to incorporate this scenario into macroprudential analysis, the macroprudential framework has so far not proved effective for nonfinancial sector firms, making thus the case of an anchoring benchmark even more compelling.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO FULL INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION AND THE
REVIVAL OF BRETTON WOODS ARRANGEMENTS?
Overview 
Why the Remedies Embedded in the International Monetary (IMF) and Trade (WTO) Legal Orders are ineffective
Article IV of the IMF Articles exchange rate would only be judged to be fundamentally misaligned if the misalignment is found to be significant; (b) the benefit of any reasonable doubt would be given to the authorities in establishing whether fundamental misalignment is present; and (c) the potential market-sensitivity of estimates of misalignment was emphasised.
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In specific, the IMF defines a number of criteria that will use in its surveillance of member state compliance with the rules against fundamental misalignment 55 :
 large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market,  excessive and prolonged official or quasi-official accumulation of foreign assets, and  large and prolonged current account deficits or surpluses.
These criteria have proved ineffective for a number of reasons. First, assuming that QE and extraordinary low interest rates are caught, the countries engaging in extraordinary monetary policies can plead that their purpose is to revive the domestic economy or counter the threat of deflation and recession rather manipulate their currency. Secondly, they can argue that the pursuit of independent monetary policy is outside the remit of the IMF Agreements and that at the end of the day a policy that leads to a revival of demand, especially in a major Fourth, there is always the defense that is frequently used by the German governments that traded surpluses are due to structural discrepancies (advnantages) in economic competitiveness and productivity and not currency misalignment, rendering the third criterion of the IMF Guidance redundant. Finally, the IMF can exercise "firm surveillance" and it has made a genuine effort to revamp its financial surveillance in recent years to include amore macroprudential/systemic strategy 56 but it cannot compel a country to change its exchange rate.
Nor can it order commercial foreign exchange dealers to change the prices at which they trade currencies. All it can do is offer economic advice and discuss how changes in countries' exchange rates might be in their own interest. 57 However, in the end, the authority to make the change resides with the country alone.
Currency Manipulation and the WTO
The WTO seeks to expand international trade through the reduction or elimination of tariffs or other barriers to trade while the IMF pursues this goal mainly through efforts to promote international monetary and exchange rate stability. Trade policy issues may feature prominently in the IMF's surveillance but as we have already explained there is probably no effective enforcement mechanism in the case of currency manipulation given the discussed above very high burden of proof. Unlike most other major international trade and finance bodies, the WTO has a mechanism for enforcing its rules. If a member country feels aggrieved by the conduct of another which it deems to be in violation of WTO rules, it may request the appointment of a dispute settlement panel to hear its complaint. The country complained of cannot block the establishment of a panel which reviews the arguments of both parties and renders judgment on whether a breach of the WTO rules has taken place. If the losing party does not comply with the decision of the panel within a reasonable timeframe then the WTO may authorize the endorsement of countervailing measures by the complaining party.
The WTO rules that can be invoked in this case refer to the prohibition of export subsidies 58 and WTO members are entitled to levy countervailing duties on imported products that receive subsidies from national government. Arguably, an undervalued currency lowers a firm's cost of production "relative to world prices and therefore helps to encourage exports".
But it is highly debatable whether intentional undervaluation of a country's currency amounts to export subsidies under the WTO's current definition of the term. 59 The term has a precise definition in the WTO Agreements which requires that there must be a financial contribution by a government to the exporter or some other form of income or price support. In addition, an export subsidy is a subsidy that is "contingent on export performance." They must also be "specific to an industry" and not provided generally to all producers. 60 Therefore, the WTO prohibition of export subsidies is very narrow and specific and does not seem to encompass currency manipulation. been suggested that the determination of "misalignment" per se may be ignored in favour of more straightforward and objective indicators. 69 The goal of the exercise would be simply to prevent a country from running large and persistent external surpluses that result from efforts to depress the value of its exchange rate in the currency markets. The reality the world faces today is that what is missing apart from the diminishing good-will in international trade is any benchmark that could objectively approximate currency values. to fundamentally alter the post-1994 trade status quo, which has brought immense wealth and prosperity to countries like China but it seems it has weakened the US economy overall. Why would then US trade counterparts accept a commitment about currency parities when, at the same time, the US will be demanding safeguards on wage levels and environmental standards from its negotiating partners, as it should, to correct some of the deficiencies of existing NAFTA and WTO agreements making such countries less competitive in trade terms?
A composite benchmark of value?
There is currently an accentuated trend in the international sphere to use composite indices to further public interest/social good goals. For example, respected Franco-German economists have suggested a composite index of GDP values to be built as a form of a tradeable synthetic Euro-asset that would replace member states bonds in Eurozone bank balance sheets thus resolving the famous doom loop under which bank over-indebtedness or a financial crisis can soon morph into a sovereign debt crisis and vice versa. 72 Similarly the EU Commission is toying with the idea of market indices to foster sustainable finance investment. 73 While both of these proposals may be open to the charge of financialisation, the index suggested here is intended to have the opposite effect. Namely to stabilise FX markers and thus curb excessive speculation/volatility in FX markets and also unmask predatory countries.
It is thus suggested here that a global unit of account (GUOA) could be created that would be freely tradeable in the same way that virtual currencies are and which will have an exchange rate with SDRs, but its composite values will be made of easily observed and the GUOA has appreciated by 5% and the country's imports by 7% whereas its exports by 3%
this is an objective though imperfect (since country productivity rates and structural or cyclical competitive advantage is not measured) indication that this country's currency is overvalued whereas that of its trade partners undervalued and so on. The onus is then on trade partners to explain the discrepancy/asymmetry to the WTO or the adjudicating body of a multilateral or bilateral trade Treaty.
The GUOA index of course has several prima facie advantages which could help rebuild trust in the international economic sphere. First, it is not bound to any particular reserve currency. Secondly, it is built on such a broad base that it cannot be manipulated. Third, it is rather representative of the growth realities and prospects of both developed and developing countries. Thus, while the stock exchange index, which is an internally uncorrelated composite index, as developed world economies do not have symmetrical growth and stock market cycles, will be over-weighted on developed economies, the global energy and commodity index will be representing the high price volatility that commodity exporters (mostly developing nations) and energy producers experience. Finally, it will all be further modified by global growth trends measured on a quarterly basis.
V. CONCLUSION
Relative stability in currency values or avoidance of excessive instability is essential for the development of global trade and investment and for cross-border financial stability. One could call FX market stability a global public good which like all such goods is often subject to a tragedy of the commons type of scenarios, presenting often a short-sighted trade advantage to predatory countries, or, less often, to market speculators. The international financial order generically lacks any effective enforcement mechanisms against currency manipulation practices and is thus unable to buttress cross-border financial stability in the event of a currency run. In addition, the international trade and monetary legal orders have proved very week enforcers of the IMF's currency tampering prohibitions. Arguably, this is not so much due to lack of will as to the fact that a mechanism approximating an objective benchmark of currency values is largely missing. At present the only workable measures seem to be capital controls, which, however, are a very blunt instrument and in many cases they might go on for very long, inspite their evident short-term benefits. They should, thus, be used as the last and not the first resort measure.
